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The Best Interest Is the Child: A Historical
Philosophy for Modern Issues
Lahny R. Silva∗

Abstract
A little over a century after the creation of the first juvenile court in
America, the states and the federal government continue to try to find an
effective and practical solution to juvenile delinquency. Beginning with the
“Best Interest of the Child Standard” in 1899, juvenile justice policy has
evolved into a mixed bag of philosophies. State statutes littered with “Best
Interest” rhetoric, have interestingly resulted in state policies that are retributive in nature and disproportionately affect minority communities. The disconnect between theory and practice is the product of decades of socio-political
influence on juvenile justice policy as well as a replacement of the “Best Interest” standard with staunch retributive ideals. This article puts forth a contemporary understanding of “Best Interest,” so as to unite theory and practice.
This union may provide guidance for more effective policies in the realm of
juvenile justice.
America faces a costly and overburdened prison industrial complex that is
fed by the juvenile justice system. Transfer provisions seamlessly transport juvenile offenders into adult court for criminal prosecution. Juveniles adjudicated in adult court face harsher penalties and diminished socio-economic opportunity than juveniles adjudged in juvenile court. While state lawmakers
have recently recognized a decrease in violent crime among juveniles overall,
many have refrained from advocating policies that promote true “Best Interest” ideals and instead have maintained a focus on law and order. Recent scientific research and psychosocial studies along with the past decade of United
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States Supreme Court precedent suggest that policymakers’ emphasis on retribution is misguided and anachronistic. Instead, legislators ought to be recognizing the real differences between juveniles and adults namely the “immaturity” of minors as well as their penchant for rehabilitation. This
principle is already entrenched in other areas of law such as the minor abortion
line of cases.
This article advocates for a return to the “Best Interest of the Child”
standard. Calling for an organic view of “Best Interest where contemporary
contextual factors may be considered,” this article suggests that “Best Interest”
calls for a focus on mitigation. This argument builds on Elizabeth S. Scott’s
and Laurence Steinberg’s mitigation theory of juvenile justice. Scott and
Steinberg argue that adolescents, because of their biological and psychosocial
distinctions, possess a diminished capacity and are thereby less criminally
blameworthy. Therefore, they argue, this diminished capacity ought to be recognized in the adult prosecution of juveniles. This article argues that Scott
and Steinberg’s mitigation paradigm implicitly contains Best Interest principles that may help guide legislators in fashioning legal tools for which to adjudicate juvenile offenders in adult court.
Beginning with a call for a “presumption of immaturity” in transfer decisions, this essay begins to examine practical solutions within a mitigation
paradigm guided by Best Interest principles. Borrowing from minor abortion
jurisprudence, it is contended that in those jurisdictions that have established
automatic transfer provisions there ought to be a “presumption of immaturity” that the state must overcome prior to commencing an adult prosecution
of a juvenile. Moreover, in the actual adjudication of a juvenile in adult court,
defenses such as diminished capacity and extreme mental or emotional disturbance (“EMED”) may provide a vehicle for the admissibility of psychological and neurological evidence associated with adolescent immaturity and development thereby allowing the fact-finder to consider such evidence in its
determination of criminal blameworthiness.

I. I NTRODUCTION
The “Best Interest of the Child” standard, a theoretical premise
deeply embedded in American jurisprudence, is in desperate need of
reframing, particularly in the context of juvenile justice administration.
While the “Best Interest of the Child” continues to be used by a majority of juvenile courts across the country, the theoretical underpinnings lack coherence and consistency, resulting in many outcomes that
416
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prove contrary to the “Best Interest of the Child.” This results in a
number of deleterious issues affecting both the individual child and
community.
The larger socioeconomic consequences of a disjointed theoretical
base are problematic not only for America’s youth but also American
taxpayers. The current juvenile justice system feeds the problem of
mass incarceration in the United States by channeling a good number
of youth into adult prison which thereby fuels the perpetuation of a
“ghetto underclass.” By revisiting and reformulating the “Best Interest
of the Child” standard in a way that addresses the current system as
well as the needs of today’s youth, policymakers and jurists alike will
have guidance in crafting workable and practical solutions to the problem of juvenile crime in their jurisdictions.
The discussion of the problem in juvenile justice administration
begins with cost. First, America spends billions of dollars annually detaining and incarcerating youthful offenders. The most recent official
national study conducted in 2011 placed 60,500 juveniles in residential
programs or correctional facilities.1 Approximately half of these youth
are non-violent offenders.2 A disproportionate number are minorities.3
In addition, there is a substantial loss in opportunity. This loss relates
not only to individual youth but to the youth’s family and larger community. This loss can be observed in terms of economic contribution
to the family, community, and tax base as well as a reduction in the
overall lifetime earning potential of the individual juvenile.
Recent scientific research and psychosocial studies, along with the
past decade of United States Supreme Court precedent, suggest that
policymakers’ emphasis on retribution is misguided and anachronistic.
Instead, legislators ought to be recognizing the real differences between juveniles and adults — namely the “immaturity” of minors as
well as their penchant for rehabilitation. This principle is already entrenched in other areas of law such as the minor abortion line of cases.
This article advocates for a return to the “Best Interest of the
Child” standard. Calling for an organic view of Best Interest where

1. RICHARD A. MENDEL, THE ANNIE CASEY FOUNDATION, NO PLACE FOR KIDS:
THE CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 1 (2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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contemporary contextual factors may be considered, this article suggests that Best Interest calls for a focus on mitigation. This argument
builds on Elizabeth S. Scott’s and Laurence Steinberg’s mitigation theory of juvenile justice.4 Scott and Steinberg argue that adolescents, because of their biological and psychosocial distinctions, possess a diminished capacity and are thereby less criminally blameworthy.5
Therefore, they argue, this diminished capacity ought to be recognized
in the adult prosecution of juveniles.6 This article argues that Scott and
Steinberg’s mitigation paradigm implicitly contains Best Interest principles that may help guide legislators in fashioning legal tools for which
to adjudicate juvenile offenders in adult court. This article explores
those possibilities. Beginning with the argument for a “presumption of
immaturity” in transfer decisions, this essay begins to examine practical solutions within a mitigation paradigm guided by Best Interest
principles. Borrowing from minor abortion jurisprudence, it is contended that in those jurisdictions that have established automatic transfer provisions there ought to be a “presumption of immaturity” that
the state must overcome prior to commencing an adult prosecution of
a juvenile. Moreover, in the actual adjudication of a juvenile in adult
court, defenses such as diminished capacity and extreme mental or
emotional disturbance (“EMED”) may provide a vehicle for the admissibility of psychological and neurological evidence associated with
adolescent immaturity and development, thereby allowing the factfinder to consider such evidence in its determination of criminal
blameworthiness.
The first half of this article is descriptive. Part II examines the historical development of juvenile courts, bringing with it the theoretical
understanding of the “Best Interest of the Child” standard in juvenile
justice administration. Part III describes the current state of affairs in
juvenile justice administration. By identifying problems within the system, including dilemmas with incarceration, transfer to adult court,
and the disproportionate impact on minority communities, one may

4. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 799, 838
(2003).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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contemplate desired outcomes. The second half of the article concentrates on reframing the “Best Interest of the Child” standard through
the mitigation paradigm advanced by Scott and Steinberg. Part IV discusses mitigation as a portal to preserving Best Interest ideals as well
as evidence that tends to support the framework. This section includes
a brief discussion of recent brain science and psychosocial research that
demonstrates real biological and social differences between minors and
adults. This section also discusses recent United State Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the issue of adolescent development. Part V lays out
presumptions and defenses that may be reconfigured for use in the
adult prosecution of juveniles. These include the establishment of an
already recognized principle, the “presumption of immaturity,” as well
as the traditional defenses of diminished capacity and extreme emotional disturbance. Part VI concludes with a summary of the main
points as well as thoughts for next steps in the development of an effective American juvenile justice system where the “Best Interest of the
Child” returns to center stage.

II. J UVENILE J USTICE IN A MERICA
The American colonies conveyed to themselves the powers held by
the English Crown concerning the welfare of juveniles.7 English common law bequeathed the right and responsibility of protecting those
persons incapable of protecting themselves to the Crown.8 The general
protection of children was bestowed upon the landed aristocracy for
the purpose of securing profits for the Crown.9 The colonies retained
this practice but extended these general protections beyond the landed
aristocracy.10
Early common law generally treated children under the age of
seven years old as “incapable of possessing criminal intent.”11 Any child

7. See DOUGLAS R. RENDLEMEN, PARENS PATRIAE: FROM CHANCERY TO THE
JUVENILE COURT, in JUVENILE JUSTICE AND PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES AND
COMMENT 58, 59–60 (Frederic L. Fraust & Paul J. Brantingham eds., 2d ed. 1979).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Punitive
Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 662 (2005).
11. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
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older than seven was treated and punished like an adult offender.12
While youths over the age of seven could be treated and punished like
their adult counterparts, they were denied a number of rights granted
to adult offenders.13 Throughout early American history, children
were understood to be “legally incompetent.”14 In most criminal matters, children under the age of seven could assert “infancy” as a defense
while older children seven to fourteen were subject to a rebuttable presumption of lack of capacity.15 Youths were subject to adult criminal
prosecution and if convicted imprisoned in adult facilities.16 With
courts rarely interfering with familial and educational pursuits, parents
and schools were permitted to use their choice of disciplinary approaches to regulate misbehavior.17
The Industrial Revolution changed the configuration of the family
structure as well as the role of the family in American society. This
presented substantial challenges with regard to children and the interaction of the state with the modernized family. States were forced to
deal with wayward children and those youths considered inveterate.18
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, moralist proponents,
known as “gentlemen reformers,” created juvenile correctional facilities for youthful offenders.19 The gentlemen reformers were largely
white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, guided by Enlightenment philosophy
and determined to eliminate pauperism.20 Such delinquents were
thought to be “a product of their bad environment and the failure of

12. Id.
13. Id. at 14.
14. Clarke, supra note10, at 12.
15. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile (In)Justice and the Criminal Court Alternative, 38 CRIME &
DELINQ. 403, 404 (1993).
16. Gerald F. Glynn, Arkansas’ Missed Opportunity for Rehabilitation: Sending Children to
Adult Courts, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 77, 80 (1997).
17. Id.
18. CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 178–209 (1980); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the
Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 821–
23 (1988).
19. Id.
20. See generally SANFORD J. FOX, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE COURT 16–29 (1996).
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the family.”21 This ideology was soon to be overshadowed by the Progressive reformers, a group largely credited with the creation of the
first juvenile court in 1899.22
Prior to 1899, early Progressive reformers in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York established Houses of Refuge.23 The purpose
of these houses was to save children from crime and imprisonment.24
The focus was on protecting children rather than punishing the youth
for engaging in criminal behavior.25 Two principal concerns guided
these reformers: the malleability of children and the idea that the
child’s environment was the primary cause of delinquent conduct.26
Delinquency was considered an outgrowth of immorality and poverty.27 With this, Progressive reformers initiated a series of developments in the administration of young offenders centering on the child
and the best interest of that child.28 The ideas of the Progressives developed into the theoretical understanding of the “Best Interest”
standard that we know today. Justice Fortas described Progressive ideology with regard to child offenders as considering “[w]hat is he, how
has he become what he is, what had best be done in his interest and in
the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.”29 It was
of no consequence to determine the actual “guilt” of the juvenile offender.30 Instead, the focus was on treating the child with the goal of
assisting in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the child’s life.31

21. Feld, supra note 18.
22. FOX, supra note 20, at 29; LEWIS P. TODD & MERLE E. CURTI, RISE OF THE
AMERICAN NATION 536 (1986).
23. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 54 (1999); John R. Sutton, Social Structure, Institution, and the Legal Status of Children in
the United States, 88 AM. J. SOC. 915, 915–19 (1983).
24. Feld, supra note 23.
25. Clarke, supra note 10, at 12.
26. Eric K. Klein, Comment, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of
Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 376 (1998).
27. Kelly Keimig Elsea, The Juvenile Crime Debate: Rehabilitation, Punishment, or Prevention, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 135, 137 (1995).
28. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
29. Id.
30. TODD & CURTI, supra note 2222, at 536.
31. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.

421

SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

6/28/2014 7:21 AM

[Vol. 28

The Progressive priority was clinical evaluation followed by treatment
and management of the child.32
The establishment of the Houses of Refuge brought with it constitutional due process challenges. There was a clear absence of formal
process in the placement of children in these facilities. Moreover, the
courts appeared to lack recognized legal authority to do so. In the midnineteenth century, courts across the country began to face this issue
head on. In Ex parte Crouse, the father of a teenage girl constitutionally
challenged her commitment to a Pennsylvania house on the basis of a
trial by jury violation.33 The basis of the complaint was a violation of
the trial by jury guarantee.34 In finding the commitment constitutional,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asserted that such commitment fell
within the parens patria of the state.35 The objective of the doctrine was
to rehabilitate and reform children as opposed to punishing the wayward youth.36 With this, the court held that due process does not prohibit a state from imposing institutional restraint on a child for the
child’s welfare.37 The doctrine was again invoked by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in 1886.38 In Farnham v. Pierce, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court permitted the commitment of a child
without a hearing to make a commitment determination.39 The court
cited parens patriae as the rationale underlying the state’s power to
place the child.40 The principle underlying these early American cases
is the idea that the state may assume control of a child for the purposes
of protecting the welfare of the child and not for purposes of criminal
adjudication and punishment.41 These cases stimulated the establishment of a separate juvenile court system with Ex parte Crouse serving
as the precedential justification for upholding juvenile commitments.42

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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Id. at 15–16.
Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839).
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Farnham v. Pierce, 6 N.E. 830, 831 (Mass. 1886).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Clarke, supra note 10, at 12.
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The first officially recognized juvenile court was established in
Cook County, Illinois in 1899.43 The jurisdictional arm of the court
applied to children under the age of sixteen years old.44 By the 1940s,
juvenile court systems were created in all fifty states.45 From the beginning, the principal consideration of the juvenile courts was the welfare
of the child.46 Juvenile courts utilized indeterminate processes that integrated principles of psychology and social work in their evaluation of
children. With this, they developed specific and individualistic treatment plans to meet the child’s needs.47 This required exercising vast
discretion in order to develop appropriate remedies that would adequately address the child’s issues.48
In the 1960s, American courts began to systematically develop the
doctrine of parens patriae understanding that wise adults ought to make
decisions in the best interest of minor children.49 In the court’s formulation of the “Best Interest,” both the child’s physical and psychosocial
well-being was paramount.50 Tension existed however, between
providing children with individual treatment and the inundation of juvenile offenders into the juvenile court system.51 The sheer volume of
cases in juvenile courts began to overburden a juvenile justice system
that had been in place since the early 1900s.52 With individual treatment no longer a viable option, courts chose between one of two

43. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
101–36 (2d ed. 1977).
44. Laureen D’Ambra, A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders
Is Not a Panacea, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 277, 280 (1997).
45. Adam D. Kamenstein, The Inner-Morality of Juvenile Justice: The Case of Consistency and
Legality, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 2105, 2111 (1997).
46. Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 375, 378
(1996).
47. Platt, supra note 43, at 43–47.
48. F. FAUST & P. BRANTINGHAM, THE INVENTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT, in
JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY 550–57 (1974),
49. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 695
(1996).
50. Gilbert v. Gilbert, No. 093459, 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2153 (Aug. 16, 1996).
51. Jennifer O’Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Note, Getting Smart About Getting Tough:
Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1299, 1303 (1996).
52. Id.
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courses: sending juveniles to correctional facilities or meting out lenient sanctions.53 The rulings of the courts slowly began to abandon individualized treatment and proportionality in juvenile punishment and
instead began to resemble adult criminal courts with penal sentences
justified with parens patriae.54 With the transformation of the juvenile
court system, the need developed for procedural protections to ensure
fairness in processes that may potentially have deprived juveniles of
their freedom. Such processes began to take shape with a number of
United States Supreme Court cases in the 1960s. Beginning with Kent
v. United States, the Court set in motion the solidification of juvenile
court as a criminal court for children by requiring constitutional criminal procedural protections for juveniles, including the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witness, the privilege
against self-incrimination, and the right to notice of the charges.55 Explicitly condemning the doctrine of parens patriae in In re Gault, the
Court asserted that “unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”56
Per the Court, children “receive[d] the worst of both worlds . . . he
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”57
Chronologically coinciding with the transformation of the juvenile
court, America itself experienced a social revolution. The 1960s
brought with it social movement. The civil rights movement and the
Vietnam War worked in sync to create a ripe political environment for
social change. The Great Migration of Black America from the South
to urban areas changed the socio-political dynamic of American urban
areas, with the result of white flight and a concentration of many poor
black Americans in one geographic area.58 The riots in Watts, Detroit,
and other areas of the country painted a stark picture of black violence
and called into question black grievances against government that were

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

O’Connor & Treat, supra note 51.
Id. at 1305–07.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 84 (2001).
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brought to the forefront during the civil rights movement.59 Conservative legislators seized the opportunity to blame social welfare programming for rising crime rates for which they received substantial electoral
gains.60 Appealing to white voters’ racial animus, Conservatives pushed
an agenda calling for personal responsibility and penal policies that
were tough on crime.61 For Lemann, “the government’s response to
[black] migration provided the conservative movement with many of
its issues.”62 This included juvenile courts.
The 1970s were characterized by both a practical and ideological
shift. The crime rate of juveniles appeared to explode as the baby boomers reached adolescence.63 The escalation of crime was most apparent
in the inner cities, which were primarily black areas.64 Liberals and
conservatives alike endorsed retributive penal polices and determinate
sentencing schemes.65 Liberals asserted that indeterminate sentencing
schemes produced egregious racial disparity while conservatives advocated for harsher criminal sentences.66 Tough on crime rhetoric produced statutes and regulations permitting punitive sentences for juvenile offenders.67 These laws underscored the juvenile’s offense while
de-emphasizing the Best Interest of the Child and parens patriae. With
this, states began to enact transfer/waiver statutes thereby permitting
juveniles to be transferred to adult court for criminal prosecution with
relative ease.68 Today, all fifty states permit some form of transfer.69 At

59. Id. at 97. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT
BLACK MIGRATION AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991).
60. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 495 (2000).
61. LEMANN, supra note 59, at 200.
62. Id.
63. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRIG & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM:
LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 66 (1997).
64. FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIMING REAHABILITATION 39–40
(1982); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT 94–95 (1995).
65. MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6–12 (1996); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile
Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Legislatives Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 471, 483–87(1987).
66. TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT, supra note 64, at 94–95.
67. THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COMMISSION 3 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996).
68. Hunter Hurst III, Crime Scene: Treating Juveniles as Adults, TRIAL, July 1997, at 34.
69. Kelly M. Angell, Note, The Regressive Movement: When Juvenile Offenders Are Treated
as Adults, Nobody Wins, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 125, 127 (2004).
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a national level, the 1970s ushered in the establishment of the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act.70 The Act emphasized four
core purposes to which juvenile justice administration was encouraged
to focus: deinstitutionalization of status offenders (truants, curfew violators), separation of juveniles from adults in jail, disallowance of the
placement of youth in adult facilities, and decrease in minority overrepresentation in the juvenile system.71
The War on Drugs was a catalyst for the enactment of determinate
sentencing policies and harsh sentences for drug offenders. The introduction of crack cocaine into urban areas in the 1980s birthed an era
of both devastation and violence in black neighborhoods.72 The drug
industry produced youths armed for their own protection with the purpose of protecting drug profits.73 Between 1986 and 1993 the juvenile
murder rate increased 278 percent for black youth while it increased
forty percent for their white counterparts.74 During the same time period, gun homicides quadrupled for juveniles75 and the myth of the
“Superpredator” was unleashed.76 The media’s portrayal of urban
black males further exacerbated anxieties calling for harsher punishment for juvenile offenders while simultaneously aggravating an already existing racial disparity in arrest rates for juvenile crime.77 The
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act enacted in the early
1970’s was modified to include minimum detention requirements and

70. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT OF 1974, 88 Stat.
1109 (1974).
71. Id.; Heather Hojnacki, Graham v. Florida: How the Supreme Court’s Rationale Encourages Reform of the Juvenile Justice System through Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies, 12 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L. J. 135, 137–38 (2012).
72. Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence, 25
CRIME & JUST. 27, 53–54 (1998).
73. Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. CRIM. &
CRIMINOLOGY 10, 39 (1995).
74. MELISSA SICKMUND, HOWARD N. SNYDER & EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIM: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 13 (1997).
75. Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Guns, and Homicide: Policy Notes on an Age-Specific Epidemic,
59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 28 (1996).
76. See, e.g., Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 1999
National Report Series, Juvenile Justice Bulletin: Challenging the Myths 2 (Feb. 2000),
available at http://www.ojjdp.gov.
77. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 13 (1999).
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an escape hatch provision in the statute.78 This provision permitted the
criminal prosecution of juveniles for weapons and violent offenses.79
Two decades later, America is experiencing the aftershocks of the
War on Drugs. The volume of cases in juvenile courts has considerably
increased “without a corresponding increase in resources.”80 The effects of these policies have resulted in 60,500 youths in correctional
facilities or other residential programs.81 Over sixty percent of those in
custody are male youth of color.82 The United States Department of
Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(“OJJDP”) recently reported that in some jurisdictions fifty percent of
juveniles released from detention are rearrested within three years or
less of release.83 Legislators have enacted a number of statutes facilitating streamlined transfers of juveniles from juvenile court to adult
court.84 Most notably, state provisions include mechanisms that circumvent “individualized treatment” and provide categorical offensebased jurisdictional requirements thereby bypassing the juvenile system altogether.85 Despite the significant changes in juvenile justice administration, most states have not completely abandoned the rehabilitative ideal encapsulated in the Best Interest of the Child paradigm.86
Most of the Best Interest principles guiding the Progressive Reformers remain important today. First, it is important to recognize that
minors are distinct from adults. The law has a history of restraining
the type of activities and freedoms to which juveniles may actively engage based solely on their age. Juveniles are not permitted to enter into
contracts, vote, enter the armed forces, or buy alcohol. It is a legal in-

78. Hojnacki, supra note 71, at 139.
79. Id.
80. Edmund F. McGarrell, Restorative Justice Conferences as an Early Response to Young Offenders, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Wash., D.C.),
Aug. 2001, at 2, available at http://www.d.umn.edu/~jmaahs/Vita%20and%20pubs/Delinquency%20and%20Juvenile%20Justice/restore1.pdf.
81. SICKMUND, ET AL., supra note 74, at 200.
82. Id. at 209.
83. Id. at 234.
84. Mark Soler, Juvenile Justice in the Next Century: Programs or Politics, 10 CRIM. JUST.
27 (1996).
85. Id.
86. Craig Hemmens, Eric J. Fritsch & Tory J. Caeti, The Rhetoric of Juvenile Justice Reform, 18 QLR 661, 677 (1999).

427

SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE)

6/28/2014 7:21 AM

BYU Journal of Public Law

[Vol. 28

consistency to allow a juvenile to be adjudicated in adult court and sentenced to adult prison, without granting corollary rights to juveniles.
Second, Best Interest ideals value the malleability of minors. It recognizes that juveniles are in psychosocial and biological transition and
are therefore capable of changing their behaviors. Finally, Best Interest
promotes clinical and individualized treatment. It seeks to review instances of juvenile delinquency on a case-by-case basis and create a
special treatment plan for that specific minor. Best Interest principles
frown upon juvenile transfer to adult court because in the case of children there is still hope for change. While juvenile courts are overburdened with the number of cases on the docket, it is important to recognize the long-term consequences of ignoring individual juvenile
issues.

III. C ONTEMPORARY I SSUES
Transfers to adult court, recidivism, and disparate impact are the
hallmark of today’s juvenile justice system. The contextual and theoretical changes that influenced the transformation of legal and institutional principles have led to a schizophrenic ideological understanding
of juvenile justice today. To pinpoint one ideological principle that
represents juvenile justice administration in America today is far from
an easy task. While the purpose clauses of juvenile codes may give
scholars and advocates an implicit hint, the codes themselves are comprised of a “mixed bag” of theoretical underpinnings that include both
“Best Interest” and retributive ideals.87 It is from these muddy waters
that an in-depth assessment of contemporary problems is examined.
Focusing specifically on transfer, imprisonment, recidivism, and disproportionate impact, this section aims to present a portrait of the current state of affairs.
A.

Transfer

Since its inception, the juvenile justice system in America has sustained statutory and regulatory provisions permitting transfer of

87. Linda F. Giardino, Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality Behind Juvenile Justice Policies in
America, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 223, 231–36 (1996).
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youths from juvenile court to adult criminal court.88 Transfer was traditionally reserved for the most extreme juvenile crimes and older
youth.89 Approximately, 200,000 juveniles are transferred to adult
court each year.90 Today, transfer provisions capture thousands of juveniles in the form of categorical offense based statutes that mandate
transfer or through largely unreviewable prosecutorial decisions. Once
a juvenile is transferred to adult court, most jurisdictions require that
he be prosecuted in adult court for any future offenses.91
The current trend in transfer decisions substantially diverges from
the original theoretical principles of “Best Interest.”92 “Best Interest”
considerations have virtually disappeared from transfer determinations
as most “decisions” to transfer are mandatory or statutorily required.93
Individualized “treatment plans” and clinical evaluations have dissipated. Moreover, the understanding that juveniles are distinct from
adults and ought to be treated differently seems to have disappeared
from discussions of transfer altogether.
1. Methods of transfer
Juveniles are commonly transferred to adult criminal court in one
of four ways: judicial waiver, statutory exclusion, prosecutorial transfers, and blended sentence.94 Judicial waiver grants juvenile judges the
authority to waive jurisdiction and transfer the case to adult court for
criminal prosecution.95 A number of statutes enumerate factors to be
taken into consideration by juvenile court judges.96 Most states still
88. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case
for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 629, 642–43 (1994).
89. Id.
90. Laurence Steinberg, Juveniles on Trial: MacArthur Foundation Study Calls Competency
into Question, 18 CRIM. JUST. 20, 21 (2003).
91. G. LARRY MAYS & RICK RUDDELL, DO THE CRIME, DO THE TIME: JUVENILE
CRIMINALS AND ADULT JUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN COURT SYSTEM 10 (2012).
92. Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile
Transfers to Adult Court, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1254, 1271 (1995).
93. Id.
94. Justice or Vengeance: How Young Is Too Young for A Child to Be Tried And Punished as an
Adult?, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 159, 168–72 (2002-2003).
95. MELISSA SICKMUND, ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., OFFICE OF JUV. JUST. AND
DELINQ. PREVENTION: HOW JUVENILES GET TO CRIMINAL COURT, OJJDP UPDATE ON
STATISTICS BULLETIN (1994).
96. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 565–68 (1996) (Appendix to Opinion of the
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permit judges to waive jurisdiction based on an assessment of the
child’s “amenability to treatment” and/or “dangerousness.”97 With
this, judges review categorical factors such as the gravity of the offense,
the circumstances of the offense, prior record, likelihood of rehabilitation, maturity, and home environment.98 Because of the subjectivity of
the fundamental issues, courts tend to interpret and ultimately apply
transfer statutes inconsistently.99
Statutory exclusions or statutory waivers provide no discretion for
judges or prosecutors in transfer cases.100 Such statutes require transfer
for certain offenses while others provide an upper age limit for juvenile
court jurisdiction.101 This is the most utilized form of transfer today;
with the Department of Justice reporting that 41.6 percent of juvenile
transfers are achieved using this method.102
Prosecutorial transfers give prosecutors discretion to file cases in
either juvenile or adult court.103 This method is known as prosecutorial
waiver or “direct file.”104 Discretion is non-appealable in some states.105
This authority, however, is not absolute.106 Prosecutors are generally
limited by age and specific offenses.107 Nevertheless, without formal
parameters, the decision to transfer is largely based on subjective considerations such as the area where the defendant resides and the gravity
of the offense.108

Court).
97. See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law
Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1006 (1995).
98. Kent, 383 U.S. at 565–68.
99. Feld, supra note 97, at 1010.
100. Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles
to Adult Court, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 521–22 (1995).
101. Id.
102. GERARD A. RAINVILLE & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL COURTS 2 (2003).
103. Barbara J. Valliere, Note, The Transfer of Juvenile Offenders to Adult Courts in Massachusetts: Reevaluating the Rehabilitative Ideal, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 989, 996 (1986).
104. Brian G. Sellers & Bruce Arrigo, Adolescent Transfer, Developmental Maturity, and Adjudicative Competence: An Ethical and Justice Policy Inquiry, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 435,
442 (2009).
105. Valliere, supra note 103.
106. SICKMUND, supra note 95, at 1.
107. Id.
108. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Transfer, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 599, 601 (2004).
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The blended sentence provides overlap between the juvenile system and adult court. These sentences involve meting out a juvenile
punishment with an adult criminal sentence suspended.109 So long as
the juvenile complies and completes the juvenile sanction, he will not
be incarcerated. However, if the juvenile fails to comply with the
court-ordered juvenile sanction, he will receive the adult sentence.
2. The courts and application
In the 1960’s and 1970’s the most common transfer strategy was
judicial waiver. With this method, juvenile court judges used their discretion to determine whether transfer to adult court was warranted after a hearing was held. During the hearing, the court examined evidence concerning a youth’s amenability to treatment and any potential
threats the juvenile posed to society. A decision to transfer to adult
court was primarily based on the juvenile’s criminal history and the
seriousness of the crime.110
a. Kent v. United States. The United States Supreme Court reviewed judicial transfer in the 1966 decision in Kent v. United States.111
In Kent, petitioner Kent was alleged to have committed a number of
crimes between the ages of fourteen and sixteen including breaking
and entering, robbery, and rape in the District of Colombia.112 He was
apprehended for the rape and robbery upon which he admitted his involvement in the current offense.113 He also volunteered information
concerning similar offenses.114 Kent was sixteen at the time, which
placed him within the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the D.C. Juvenile
Court.115 However, the D.C. statute provided that the district court
judge could waive jurisdiction after a “full investigation.”116 In Kent’s

109. MAYS & RUDDELL, supra note 91.
110. Sellers & Arrigo, supra note 104.
111. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
112. Id. at 543. Kent was fourteen years old when he was accused of breaking and entering
into several homes as well as purse snatching. This precipitated his entry into the juvenile court
system. He was placed on probation. Two years later, he was charged with rape, breaking and
entering, and robbery. He was sixteen years old.
113. Id. at 544.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 543.
116. Id. at 547.
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case, the district court judge waived juvenile court jurisdiction.117 The
district court did not hold a hearing, nor did the judge rule on petitioner’s motion on the issue of waiver.118 On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, Kent attacked the waiver on Due Process
grounds. He claimed that that the waiver was defective because no
hearing was held and the Juvenile Court judge made no explicit statements for the determination.119 The United States Supreme Court
agreed.120
In an opinion written by Justice Fortas, the Court concluded that
the D.C. Juvenile Court Act did not permit a juvenile court judge to
decide on its own accord, without any participation from the child or
the child’s representative, the “critically important” issue of waiver.121
For the Court, “there is no place in our system of law for reaching a
result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony—without
hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of
reasons.”122 In discussing the primary function of the Juvenile Court,
the Court asserted that Juvenile Court is parens patriae as opposed to a
prosecutor or judge.123 Juvenile courts are to decide the needs of a child
as opposed to criminally prosecute.124 Because of this theoretical function, courts have determined that juvenile court proceedings are “civil”
as opposed to “criminal” in nature and have prohibited later complaints from juveniles regarding a deprivation of rights.125 However, it
was well established that a juvenile can claim a deprivation of due process.126 With this, the Supreme Court did two important things. First,
it established that the decision to transfer a juvenile is a “critically important” proceeding.127 For the Court, “an opportunity for a hearing
which may be informal, must be given the child prior to entry of a

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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waiver order.”128 The Court also required the Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver order with a statement of reasons or considerations.129 Such a statement may not be an assumption or boilerplate
mimicking the statutory language. At the very least, the statement
should include relevant facts so as to provide a factual basis for the
waiver determination.130 The Kent decision set a minimum standard of
due process in juvenile court waiver proceedings. At the very least, a
juvenile is entitled to a hearing and representation of counsel.131 Today, Kent is being circumvented by automatic transfer statutes and direct files methods. While Kent requires protections in the context of
judicial waiver, it does not speak to legislative directives or prosecutorial discretion. States appear to understand Kent as a judicial waiver
case only. However, Kent may be understood as applicable to juvenile
transfer generally. Nevertheless, that argument is not an issue currently before the Court.
b. Lower Courts. Wyoming vests jurisdiction over minors charged
with violent felonies in both district and juvenile courts.132 In evaluating transfer cases, courts are required to consider evidence pertaining
to statutory factors.133 These factors include the seriousness of the alleged offense and the protection of the community, whether the alleged offense was committed with premeditation and violence,
whether the alleged offense was against persons, previous history of
the juvenile, and the maturity of the juvenile.134 Maturity is to be “determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living.”135 Wyoming places the burden
of production on the minor requiring him to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the case ought to be transferred to the juvenile court.136 The State, however, maintains the burden of persuading

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 561.
Id.
Id.
Id.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-203(f)(iv) (2013).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237(b)(i)–(vii).
Id.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237(b)(v).
JB v. State, 305 P.3d 1137, 1139 (Wyo. 2013).

433

SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

6/28/2014 7:21 AM

[Vol. 28

the court that adult court ought to maintain jurisdiction over the minor.137
The federal statute governing juvenile transfer is established in the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act.138 While the federal
system has not established specifically-enumerated juvenile offenses,
juveniles may be charged with criminal offenses and prosecuted in
adult court. The Act established a number of procedures and required
proceedings governing juvenile transfer in the federal jurisdictions.
These proceedings have been characterized as “civil” in nature with
the government bearing the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence the need for transfer.139 In order to make its determination, the federal courts must consider evidence pertinent to factors
outlined in § 5032.140 These factors include:
[T]he age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the
alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile’s prior delinquency record; the extent and nature of the of the juvenile’s present
intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of
past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response to such efforts; the
availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile’s behavioral
problems.141

The court is not required to examine the accuracy of the allegations against the juvenile and may assume that a juvenile has in fact
committed the offense.142 The court may order transfer if it finds that
it “would be in the interest of justice by a preponderance of the evidence.”143
While judicial waiver was the common mode of transfer, today it
is the least utilized. With statutory exclusion and direct file methods,
the number of juveniles adjudicated in adult court increased seventy-

137. Id. at 1141.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012).
139. United States v. A.R., 38 F.3d 699, 703 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Juvenile Male
#1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1322–23 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. T.F.F., 55 F.3d 1118, 1122 (6th Cir.
1995); United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012).
141. Id.
142. United States v. Juvenile, 451 F.3d 571, 576 (9th Cir. 2006).
143. United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 858 (4th Cir. 2005).
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three percent from 1986 to 1994.144 This path leads to a number of
problems including high rates of criminal recidivism and disproportionate impact on minority communities and children with disabilities.
3. Problems with transfer
A number of issues have surfaced as a result of the frequency of
transfer. First, the majority of juveniles transferred to adult court are
first time and nonviolent offenders.145 Violent juvenile offenders including those convicted of murder and rape comprise less than 0.5 percent of the juvenile offending population.146 This category of juvenile
offenders was the originally intended target of transfer mechanisms as
opposed to nonviolent juveniles.147 Legislatures anticipated transfer
provisions to apply to serious violent offenders and recidivists.148 However, many of the cases transferred from juvenile court to adult criminal court consist of property and drug crimes.149 Transferring non-violent youth will continue to clog an already overburdened adult
criminal court docket.
The Juvenile Justice Standards Project of the Institute of Judicial
Administration in collaboration with the American Bar Association
(“IJA-ABA”) produced a set of model rules and standards governing
juvenile justice administration.150 On the issue of transfer, the IJA-ABA
rules encourage a determination by the juvenile court that a juvenile is
“not a proper person to be handled by the juvenile court.”151 The
standards set out a number of factors meant to guide the court in its
evaluation. The factors include the seriousness of the alleged offense,

144. Dana Royce Baerger et al., Competency to Stand Trial in Preadjucated and Petitioned Juvenile Defendants, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 314, 314 (2003).
145. See DEAN J. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO
CRIMINAL COURTS: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 77 (1991).
146. MICHAEL A. JONES & BARRY KRISBERG, IMAGES AND REALITY: JUVENILE CRIME,
YOUTH VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 10 (1994).
147. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 145, at 79.
148. Id. at 74.
149. See Eric Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, Juvenile Waiver in the United States 1979-1995:
A Comparison and Analysis of State Waiver Statutes, 46 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 17, 18 (1995).
150. IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED: A BALANCED APPROACH
(Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. ed., 1996).
151. Charles Whitebread, Standards Relating to Transfer Between Courts, in IJA-ABA
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED: A BALANCED APPROACH supra note 150, at 288.
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criminal history involving violence; the inefficacy of available dispositions; and dispositional alternatives available in the criminal justice system.152 The court’s determination must be supported by clear and convincing evidence on all of these factors.153 The standards encourage
that juveniles be given the opportunity to contest waiver by producing
evidence that challenges the state’s evidence on the matter.154
In addition to the frequency of transfer, adult court does not typically have the resources to “treat” juvenile offenders.155 Aimed at punishment, adult court does not provide juvenile offenders with treatment and services that contemplate adolescent development and
amenability to rehabilitation.
Transferring juveniles to adult court also significantly impacts the
life of the individual juvenile. A felony conviction substantially impairs
life prospects for all offenders. The stigma that attaches to “felon” status affects both civil liberties and the economic earning capacity of the
juvenile.156 The cost to the American taxpayer is unquantifiable and is
primarily felt on two fronts. First, national and state economies suffer
with oppressive expenditures on corrections. In 2007, the federal government spent $228 billion dollars on justice administration.157While
juvenile justice administration may comprise a smaller percentage of
total spending, it substantially contributes to adult corrections expenditures with approximately thirty-five to fifty percent of adult offenders
having juvenile histories.158 These numbers suggest that the current
juvenile system is not functioning so as to divert the juvenile offender
away from adult criminality. Instead, it is feeding it.
Shouldering this financial burden is the American taxpayer, who is
also losing in the form of squandered social capital and untapped talent. Youth sentenced to detention and imprisonment have less socio-

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 290.
155. CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 145, at 74–75.
156. Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-violent Federal Offenders, 79 CINN. L. REV. 155, 165–66 (2011).
157. TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT 1982–2007
STATISTICAL TABLES, NCJ 236218, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Dec. 2011).
158. Id.
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economic prospects over a lifetime. In general, newly released offenders face high levels of unemployment as well as below-average wages.159
On average, incarceration reduces wages by at least eleven percent,
cuts yearly employment by nine weeks, and reduces annual earnings by
at least forty percent.160 When years of work experience are statistically
controlled, the results change very little.161
The predominance of transfer today speaks to the success (or failure) of the juvenile justice system. In a system where a juvenile may
not be a party to a contract, lawfully work and travel, vote, buy alcohol
or cigarettes, or even attend an adult motion picture, it seems rather
counterintuitive that the same system would permit minors to be prosecuted in adult court.162 Scholars continually question whether juvenile
justice administration may be considered successful in light of the fact
that many juveniles, particularly non-violent, are transferred to adult
court to face retributive sanctions. The current system is in effect funneling youth into jail and ultimately results in “felon” status.
B. Incarceration
Approximately 250,000 juveniles are prosecuted and incarcerated
as adults annually.163 While juvenile detention itself is fraught with
physical and sexual violence, those juveniles transferred and adjudicated in adult court face more severe challenges. Juveniles incarcerated
in adult facilities are more likely to be sexually abused and face physical
violence. This in turn has damaging effects on the individual’s psychosocial development.
Juvenile offenders transferred to adult court are traditionally sentenced to one of three types of imprisonment: segregated incarceration, graduated incarceration, or adult incarceration.164 Segregated incarceration separates juvenile and younger offenders from adult

159. BRUCE WESTERN & BECKY PETIT, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S
EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 11 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2403–04 (2011).
163. Elizabeth Cate, Teach Your Children Well: Proposed Challenges to the Inadequacies of Correctional Special Education for Juvenile Inmates, 34 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 5 (2010).
164. Bree Langemo, Serious Consequences for Serious Juvenile Offenders: Do Juveniles Belong
in Adult Court?, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 141, 154 (2004).
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offenders. This separation is maintained until the expiration of the
youthful offender’s sentence even if the juvenile reaches the age of maturity.165 In the graduated incarceration system, the juvenile is detained
in a juvenile facility until the individual reaches the age of majority
where he or she is subsequently placed in an adult facility.166 In the
adult incarceration system, a juvenile that is sentenced as an adult is
sent to adult prison.167
Youth sentenced to adult prison during a developmental era in the
adolescents’ life when they are pursing social identity, independence,
and societal associations will face damaging consequences to the overall health of the individual.168 Normal adolescent development occurs
within small social networks such a family, school peers, and neighborhoods.169
Thus, juvenile offenders sentenced to adult prison will be socialized in prison. Professor Fagan argues that in these circumstances two
consequences are likely to occur: “attenuated development of normative developmental skills and states, or skewed development of skills
and states that reflect the contingencies and norms of the adult correctional context.”170 Either way, adolescent development will be distorted by the violent socialization experienced in adult prison facilities.171
Juvenile offenders placed in adult institutions face a higher risk of
violence than those that are placed in juvenile facilities. “Juveniles in
adult institutions are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted,
twice as likely to be beaten by staff, and fifty percent more likely to be
attacked with a weapon than minors in juvenile facilities.”172 In addi-

165. Id. See also NEV. DEP’T OF CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION 502 (Oct. 14,
2013).
166. Id.
167. Id. See also BARRY C. FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 179, 222 (Thomson West, 2003).
168. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 268 (1996).
169. Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal Consequences
of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 32 (2002).
170. Id. at 34.
171. Id. at 35.
172. Lisa S. Beresford, Is Lowering the Age at Which Juveniles Can Be Transferred to Adult
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tion, adult correctional facilities are inadequately equipped with treatment and programming appropriate for servicing youth.173 Poor vocational and educational training serve to weaken opportunities of socioeconomic mobility while prison culture tends to encourage violence as
a problem-solving and status-building technique.174 Juveniles will
therefore re-enter society with rather large developmental deficits as
well as weakened social ties to the offender’s community.175
C. Recidivism
A number of studies have determined that transfer to adult court
actually increases the rate of recidivism for juvenile offenders.176 Moreover, those juveniles sentenced to adult prison also have higher rates
of recidivism.177 Those punished as adults are three times more likely
to recidivate than those retained in the juvenile system.178
A research study conducted in Minneapolis, Minnesota from
1986–1992 reported that fifty-eight percent of youths transferred to
adult court committed a new offense(s) within two years of conviction
while forty-two percent of youths retained in juvenile court recidivated.179
A Florida study showed similar results with the recidivism rates
within three years of conviction at thirty percent for transferred youth
compared to nineteen percent in juvenile court.180
A study that compared the recidivism rate for juvenile robbery offenders reported that those transferred to adult court consistently had

Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
783, 821–22 (2000); see also Jarod K. Hofacket, Justice or Vengeance: How Young Is Too Young for a
Child to Be Tried and Punished as an Adult?, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 159, 173 (2003).
173. Fagan, supra note 169, at 33.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. For discussions of these studies, see Angell, supra note 69, at 140 ; Fagan, supra note
169, at 24–28; Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal System, in CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 81–167 (Michael Tonry ed., 2000); Beresford, supra note 172,
at 822.
177. Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-Making:
Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392 (2000).
178. Id.
179. Fagan, supra note 169, at 24.
180. Id. at 25.
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a higher recidivism rate than those kept in juvenile court.181 The study
also reported that the re-arrest rate for juveniles incarcerated in adult
prison was twenty-five percent higher than those detained in a juvenile
facility.182
A Florida study, using data from between 1985 and 1987, compared youth who were transferred to adult court to those youth processed in juvenile court.183 In this study, researchers paired offenders
based on specific characteristics including age, race, gender, type of
offense, criminal history, etc.184 The study conducted two separate assessments.185 The study reported that transfer to adult court increased
recidivism in all seven offenses used in the study.186
D. Disproportionate Impact
1. Minority children
From the early nineteenth century to the present, juvenile justice
has systematically singled out poor children for punishment while their
middle and upper class counterparts were given more lenient treatment. The current overrepresentation of poor black children in the
juvenile justice system is an extension of this tradition. A comprehensive analysis regarding racial disproportionality requires an examination of law enforcement and juvenile justice system policies and practices that is beyond the scope of this article. For purposes of the present
research issues, statistics will inform the analysis.
Black juvenile offenders are more likely to be waived and processed
in criminal court.187 Black youth comprise thirty-seven percent of

181. Id. at 27.
182. Id.
183. Donna M. Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does it Make a
Difference?, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 175 (1996).
184. Id. at 176–77.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 183.
187. Kristi Holsinger, Youth in the Juvenile Justice System: Characteristics and Patterns of Involvement, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 24, 37
(Francine T. Sherman & Francine H. Jacobs eds., 2011).
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transfer decisions while fifty-nine percent of white youth are transferred to criminal court.188 Latino youth are also disproportionately
represented in transfer decisions. However, accurate data on this demographic is difficult to ascertain due to “shortcomings in available
data.”189
In 2003, there were more than 59,000 minority offenders in juvenile facilities across the country comprising sixty-one percent of those
in detention.190 Black youths specifically accounted for thirty-eight
percent of all offenders. Currently, black juveniles have the highest
proportionate rate of detention among racial groups. The Justice Department reports that for every 100,000 black juveniles living in the
U.S., 754 were detained in a juvenile facility in 2003 as compared to
the detention rate of 348 for Hispanics and 190 for whites.191 In every
state except Vermont, the custody rate for black juvenile offenders exceeds the rate for whites.192 Nationally, the ratio of the custody rate for
minorities to that of whites was 2.6 to 1.193 This trend can also been
seen across the states. For example, minority youth between the ages
of ten and seventeen represent less than twenty-five percent of the
Florida population but comprise fifty-five percent of the juvenile transfers to adult court.194
The disproportionate impact of transfer on minority offenders follows that group throughout the processes associated with the administration of justice. Minority juveniles were more likely than white juveniles to be in facilities with locked doors or gates.195 Among
minorities, Hispanic youth were more likely to be held under locked
arrangements than were other minorities.196 “Minority offenders in
California are more likely than white offenders to receive harsher sentences for equivalent offenses.”197

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Sickmund, Snyder & Poe-Yamagata, supra note 74, at 209.
Id.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Angell, supra note 69.
Sickmund, Snyder & Poe-Yamagata, supra note 74, at 209.
Id.
Angell, supra note 69, at 141–42.
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Furthermore, the disproportionate number of minority juvenile
offenders processed through the juvenile justice system means an unbalanced number of minority men living with the collateral consequences associated with “felon” status. This translates into lifetime opportunity loss for the offender in the areas of employment, education,
civil liberties, and government benefits.
2. Children with disabilities
Minorities are not the only demographic with disproportionate
representation. Children with special education needs are also disproportionately represented. One judge in Nevada commented,
More and more minors are getting involved in the juvenile justice
system because they have mental-health needs that are not being
treated. They are acting out; they are committing offenses because
they have mental-health problems that need to be addressed. Although we certainly get some violent crimes and drug problems, the
main things we are seeing are cases where families are in desperate
need of help for kids who have mental-health problems.198

Youth with mental disabilities represent nine percent of the juvenile
population but generally represent thirty-six percent of juvenile offenders.199 Other studies report that eighty-five percent of juveniles
currently in correctional facilities need mental health treatment.200
While the early implementation of Progressive ideals may not be
adequate in addressing today’s concerns, there are important and valuable principles that may be taken from the overall theoretical basis of
the Progressive movement itself and interposed in the current dialogue
concerning juvenile justice administration. The principle that children
are amenable to reform as well as the idea that the “Best Interest of the
Child” ought to guide determinations in transfer decisions are normative ideals that are worth preserving.

198. Richard D. Williamson, Tracking Trends in Juvenile Justice, 16 NEV. LAW. 20, 20
(2008) (quoting Judge Schmuck).
199. Cate, supra note 163, at 10.
200. Kristina Menzel, The School-to-Prison Pipeline: How Schools are Failing to Properly Identify
and Service Their Education Students and How One Probation Department Has Responded to the Crisis,
15.3 LOY. PUB. INT. L. REP. 198, 200 (2010).
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IV. Mitigations as the Portal
In the new millennium, scholars and researchers possess over a
century of jurisprudence as well as empirical and scientific data that
allow for the formulation of a theoretical framework that can help
guide legislatures in fashioning an appropriate and workable juvenile
justice system. Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg have developed
a theoretical model espousing mitigation-based principles in the assessment of juvenile crime.201 Their mitigation model of juvenile justice implicitly recognizes “Best Interest” ideals. Their model, backed
by recent psychosocial research and United States Supreme Court
precedent, focuses on the differences in criminal culpability and
blameworthiness between juveniles and adults.202 Because of the psychological and biological evidence affirmatively showing real differences in decision-making capabilities between adolescents and adults,
the law should recognize these differences in meting out punishment.
The United State Supreme Court has identified and adopted such distinctions in its assessment of the constitutionality of the death penalty
and later in the administration of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in non-homicidal criminal cases for juveniles. The
recognition and consideration of the mitigating aspects of youth suggest that this framework is a natural and logical extension of juvenile
justice jurisprudence.
A. The Paradigm of Mitigation
Scott and Steinberg’s groundbreaking article, Blaming Youth,203 develops a, theoretical framework for thinking about justice policy and
“the empirical reality of adolescence.”204 They have developed a mitigation based model of juvenile justice premised on proportionality and
diminished capacity.205 Weighing heavily on the adolescent developmental factors discussed below, they argue that these developmental

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Scott & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 838.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 839.
Id.
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influences “undermine decision-making capacity in ways that are accepted as mitigating culpability.”206 The underlying premises of their
model include: 1) psychosocial immaturity of juveniles and scientific
evidence demonstrating biological distinctions between juveniles and
adults and 2) mitigation of criminal culpability in criminal law.207
These differences, while significant, do not absolutely excuse an adolescent’s criminal conduct.208 Instead, they argue, distinctions ought to
be treated as mitigation in criminal punishment requiring proportionality in accordance with this diminished blameworthiness reflected in
the overall sentence.209
This paradigm recognizes an important “Best Interests” ideal:
youths are capable of change. With regard to impulsivity and mood
control, Scott and Steinberg discuss the notion that adolescents may
have more trouble controlling impulses and moods than adults.210 In
accordance with this proposition, they cite research reporting that impulsivity eventually declines during early adulthood.211 Explicit recognition of the fact that most youthful offenders do not develop into
adult criminals provides strong support for their overall thesis that because juveniles are immature, they possess a diminished criminal culpability that ought to serve as a basis for mitigation in punishment. In
implementing a mitigation based approach to juvenile justice, Scott
and Steinberg consider the same psychosocial factors as the United
States Supreme Court. The framework comports with the most current understandings of adolescent development and implicitly promotes “Best Interests” considerations. On a structural level, Scott and
Steinberg consider application primarily in the context of punishment
and explore the potential for its use in other circumstances in the adult
prosecution of juveniles.212 They consider a more individualized con-

206. Id. at 830.
207. Id. at 829–32.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 816.
211. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 4 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman,
Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 20 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 249, 260 (1996)).
212. Id. at 837–38.
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sideration of mitigation based on immaturity but dismiss such a presumption as an “error-prone undertaking, with the outcomes determined by factors other than immaturity.”213 While maybe not a workable presumption in the context of punishment, a presumption of
immaturity may work before the adult prosecution of a juvenile even
begins: transfer.
B. The Sciences
Recent advances in neuroscience as well psychology have informed
scholars, courts, and policymakers in the mental capabilities of juveniles. Mounting physiological and biological research suggests that juveniles are biologically different from adults. Recent neuro-scientific
research in the brain development of pre-teens and teenagers demonstrate that there are real and substantial distinctions in the capacities
between juveniles and adults that are related to the determination of
criminal culpability. Such date has been used as the primary reasoning
underlying recent United State Supreme Court decisions treating juveniles different than adults in criminal investigation and prosecution.
With these developments in science and law comes the responsibility
of lawmakers to examine the data and fashion juvenile justice policy
accordingly.
Criminal culpability requires the determination of responsibility
for a willful act. Responsibility in turn requires the capacity to be accountable for one’s deliberate actions. The ability to generate actions
that are willful and planned requires psychological abilities that are
supported by the complex brain mechanisms discussed below. These
physiological mechanisms are related to “[e]xecutive function and cognitive control are terms used in psychology and neuroscience to describe the ability to generate actions that are voluntary and goal-directed.”214 These functions include self-monitoring and “inhibition of
distracting impulses.”215 Immature executive function and decreased
cognitive control substantially inhibit a juvenile’s ability to adequately
assess circumstances in which responsibility and consequences are
213. Id. at 837.
214. Beatriz Luna, Relevance of Immaturities in the Juvenile Brain from Culpability and Rehabilitation, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1471 (2012).
215. Id.
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given the requisite consideration for purposes of criminal prosecution.216
A recent article in the Hastings Law Journal discusses this very
phenomenon.217 The article asserts that although the basic ability to
voluntarily inhibit responses is available at infancy, the ability to generate correct inhibitory responses” is the measure to which adult cognitive control is evaluated.218 In the best case scenario, “adult level cognitive control is evident by fifteen years of age.”219 An MRI scanner has
demonstrated that:
[W]here anxiety increases, performance deteriorates compared to
adults, suggesting that while they have access to adult level inhibitory
control, it is still immature and susceptible to errors. Given known
increased reactivity to socioemotional stimuli, this could undermine
the ability to apply inhibitory control.220

The frontal lobes are the area of the brain that is associated with
the development of critical judgment and learning.221 A reduction of
blood flow to this area of the brain, a condition known as hypofrontality, is known to be present in post-traumatic stress disorder, bi-polar
disorder, and depression.222 Normal adolescents show a mild form of
hypofrontality.223 Testing demonstrates mild decreases in frontal lobe
function.224 When this is coupled with increased levels of sex hormones
associated with puberty the result can be hyperresponsiveness to stimuli.225
It has also recently been discovered that the maturation in the part
of the brain responsible for making sound judgments and calming disruptive emotions, the systems in the ventromedial and dorsolateral regions of the prefrontal cortex, occur later in adolescent development

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
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than previously thought.226 It is now believed that the ultimate stage of
development in this area of the brain actually occurs in an individual’s
twenties.227 These areas of the brain are associated with self-control,
inhibiting impulsive action, social judgment, and cost-benefit analyses
in decision-making situations.228 Research has also demonstrated that
completion of the physiological development of the brain; the sheathing of the nerves, which connect different processing centers, is not
ultimately finished until the early twenties.229 This sheathing also affects the part of the brain that “regulate[s] emotion, judgment, and impulse control.”230
Impulsivity, a hallmark characteristic of adolescent behavior, has
been examined quite extensively in recent years. Defined as, “a predisposition toward rapid, unplanned reactions to internal or external
stimuli without regard to the negative consequences of these reactions
to the impulsive individuals or others”231 impulsivity is action with
“minimal or complete lack of forethought.”232 A recent research study
published by Laurence Steinberg reports significant age differences in
planning ahead, time perspective and anticipation of future consequences.233 With this, the impulsivity inherent in adolescents is directly
related to the moral culpability of a juvenile offender.
The significance of these physiological and brain science advances
is quite clear. Adolescents are not comparable to adults in decisionmaking capacities because of the developmental differences. Hyperresponsiveness to stimuli, immaturity in brain development, and the

226. Shannon Brownlee et al., Inside the Teen Brain, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug.
9, 1999, at 44; Luna, supra note 214, at 1478.
227. John McCrone, Rebels with a Cause, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 22, 2000, at 2.
228. L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOHAVIORAL REVIEWS 417 (2000).
229. Brownlee, supra note 226, at 5.
230. Id. at 5–6.
231. Matthew S. Stanford et al., Fifty Years of the Barrett Impulsiveness Scale: An Update and
Review, 47 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 385, 385 (2009) (citing F. G. Moeller, et
al., Psychiatric aspects of impulsivity, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 158, 1783–1793 (2001)).
232. Marsha Levick, Jessica Feierman, Sharon Messenheimer Kellley, Naomi E.S. Goldstein & Kacey Mordecai, The Eighth Amendment Evolves: Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Through The Lens of Childhood And Adolescence, 15 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 295 (2012).
233. Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting,
80 CHILD. DEV. 28, 34–35 (2009).
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lack of a fully developed sheathing process together result in an undeveloped youth who is incapable of engaging in the full range of processes required in adult type decision-making. This in turn affects
judgment and criminal blameworthiness.
The physiological and biological immaturities in the adolescent
brain do not satisfy traditional notions of criminal culpability inherent
in the mens rea requirements of criminal offenses including “willful act”
or “deliberate indifference.” At most, juvenile offenders would be
“reckless” or “negligent.” That a juvenile has not reached full maturity
and is acting without optimal executive control should be considered
not only when making transfer determinations but also in the overall
sanctioning of youthful offenders. The United States Supreme Court
has taken such information into account in recent decisions.
C. United States Supreme Court Precedent
Over the past decade the Supreme Court has cultivated important
substantive jurisprudence in the area of adolescent development and
the distinctions between adolescents and adults.234 The Court has repeatedly asserted that a child’s age is “more than a chronological
fact.”235 Over the years, this principle has evolved into a body of law
centered on the idea that minors are less mature than adults and are
more susceptible to outside influences.236
In the 2005 United States Supreme Court case of Roper v. Simmons,237 the Court was asked to review the constitutionality of the
death penalty as a sentence meted out to juvenile offenders in homicidal cases. Taking center stage was the issue concerning the psychosocial and biological differences between juveniles and adults. Writing
for the majority, Justice Kennedy embraced the notion that juveniles
(under the age of eighteen) were categorically less blameworthy than

234. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011
(2010); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 445 U.S. 104 (1982); Bellotti v. Baird,
442 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
235. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569 (2005); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 445 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
236. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011).
237. Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

448

SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE)

415]

6/28/2014 7:21 AM

The Best Interest Is the Child

adults and thus could not receive the death penalty.238 In its reasoning
the Court specifically discussed recognized three important differences
between juveniles and adults. First, the Court recognized the recent
scientific and psychological studies that to real differences between juveniles and adults.239 Kennedy asserted,
[A]s any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of maturity
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth
more often than in adults and are more understandable among the
young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions.’240

Second, the Roper Court also recognized that juveniles were more
susceptible to peer pressure.241 Citing a recent article by Elizabeth
Scott and Laurence Steinberg, the Court concluded that this vulnerability to outside pressures “is explained in part by the prevailing circumstances that juveniles have less control, or less experience with
control, over their own environment.”242 With this, the Court recognizes that minors lack the impulse controls that adults have or ought
to have. Finally, the Court asserted “that the character of a juvenile is
not as well formed as that of an adult.”243 For the Court, the factors
contributing to this immaturity diminishes the moral culpability of the
juvenile’s conduct.244 Moreover, these very characteristics that make a
juvenile reckless and impetuous are transient, and as the youth mature
and grow these characteristics may subside and dissipate.245 Dissenting,
Justice Scalia’s argument on these points was that the studies “in no
way justify a constitutional imperative that prevents legislatures and
juries from treating exceptional cases in an exceptional way.”246 With
most of the members of the Court finding merit in the psychological
and brain science studies provided by the respondent and his amici, the

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 569.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 619. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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Court began the transformation of the treatment of juvenile offenders
in the American criminal justice system.
In 2010, Graham v. Florida247 was decided. The issue before the
Court was whether a juvenile could be constitutionally sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide
offense.248 Justice Kennedy, again writing for the majority, cited the
scientific and psychological research in Roper as well as emerging developments in the field of neuroscience to invalidate the sentence on
Eighth Amendment grounds.249 Moreover, the Court cited a number
of amici that pointed out the biological and psychological developmental differences of juveniles as data supporting its holding.250 Finding
merit in the argument that juveniles are more capable of reformation
and change than adults, the Court decided that courts ought to treat
juveniles differently than adults in jurisdictions that mete out sentences
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in non-homicidal
offenses.251 Specifically, Justice Kennedy concluded that juveniles (like
the appellant) possess a “twice diminished moral culpability.”252
The Court also cited the research relied on in Roper and Graham
in its 2011 decision in JDB. v. North Carolina.253 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a child’s age was relevant to the “custody” determination as well as the decision to administer Miranda warnings.254
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor asserted that “children
characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and
possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around
them.”255 More specifically in the context of police questioning and interrogation, Justice Sotomayor quoted precedent stating, “events that
‘would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm
a lad in his early teens.’”256

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

450

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
Id. at 1.
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
Id. at 2409.
Id. at 2403.
Id. (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion)).
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With this, the Court further entrenched the notion that juveniles
are different than adults and should be treated as such. This time, the
Court extended the principle outside the context of punishment and
applied it to the prophylactic constitutional protections of Miranda.
The most recent Supreme Court decision recognizing a distinction
between juveniles and adults occurred in the 2012 case of Miller v. Alabama.257 In Miller, the juvenile petitioners were charged and convicted
of murder and sentenced in accordance to state statute to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.258 The Court held that life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for those who committed crimes when they were under the age of eighteen constituted cruel
and unusual punishment, thereby violating the Eighth Amendment.259
Relying heavily on the principles and studies discussed in Roper and
Graham, the Miller Court insisted that a sentencing court have the
ability to consider information regarding characteristics inherent in
adolescent development and the lesser culpability of youths generally.260
In the past ten years, the United States Supreme Court has effectively re-shaped our thinking about the treatment of juveniles in our
system of criminal justice. For the Court, the physiological, psychological, and biological differences matter. Moreover, this immaturity
and inability to adequately render decisions convinces the Court that
juveniles are incapable of forming the mens rea required to be punished
as adults in the most severe criminal cases. With jurisprudence in this
area evolving towards treating juveniles differently, state courts are
forced to take notice and move forward accordingly.

257. Miller v. Alabama , 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012).
258. Id. at 2460–63. There were two petitioners in this case. Petitioner Kuntrell Jackson
was fourteen years old when he was charged with capital felony murder and aggravated robbery
in Arkansas. The prosecutor directly filed into adult court. Petitioner Jackson moved to transfer
the case to juvenile court but the trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed.
Petitioner Miller, fourteen at the time of the alleged crimes, was charged and convicted of murder
in the course of arson. The prosecutor moved to transfer the case to district court. Miller appealed. In affirming the district court, the Alabama Court of Appeals cited Miller’s “mental maturity” and his criminal history.
259. Id. at 2469.
260. Id. at 2467.
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D. Summary

Scott and Steinberg’s mitigation paradigm serves as a portal for
legislators to remain faithful to Best Interest ideals. Focusing on a
lesser culpability, immaturity, and the likelihood for change, Scott and
Steinberg’s diminished culpability framework provides a platform for
the development of other legal tools to protect youth from their own
flawed decision-making. Backed by the sciences and encouraged by
stare decisis, a mitigation approach to juvenile justice may provide a basis for the establishment of a legislative safety valve prior to the transfer
decision and the creation of a partial defense in adult criminal prosecutions.

V.

Best Interest of the Child Modified

Taking into account the contemporary understanding of adolescent development, it is important to ensure that the law and policy
governing juvenile crime reflect this knowledge. One resolution is to
allow evidence of a juvenile’s neuro-psychological development to enter into transfer determinations of prosecutors, judges, and legislative
mandate. By allowing the decision-maker to consider the immaturity
and mental capacity of the individual offender, courts will be required
to take a closer look at not only the individual offender but also at the
information and data on adolescent development. Another method
that will ensure the presentation of such evidence is to permit juvenile
offenders prosecuted in adult court to present a partial defense of diminished capacity thereby allowing for the possible mitigation of the
offense in general. This section explores both of these options in detail.
A. Presumption of Immaturity
In order to ensure that juvenile justice administration is keeping
with the foundational ideals of the Best Interest, it is critical to fashion
a procedure that recognizes both the psychosocial concerns in adolescent development as well as recent United States Supreme Court precedent. The Court has stated that “the State is entitled to adjust its legal
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system to account for children’s vulnerability.”261 A minor’s susceptibility to outside pressures and peer influence, impulsivity, and a general lack of perspective and judgment places a moral imperative on the
State to consider these factors in evaluating a transfer decision. For the
Court, “The State has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare
of its young citizens, who immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights
wisely.”262 Thus, the state must consider it a duty to protect juveniles
from themselves.
One way that states may protect its minors is to presume immaturity and work toward a solution or disposition from that point. Recognized in the context of minor abortions, the presumption of immaturity posits that juveniles are not mature enough to decide whether to
undergo an abortion and therefore parental involvement is legally required in the decision-making process.263 This principle is easily transferrable in the context of juvenile justice administration, particularly in
the context of juvenile transfers to adult court. The idea is that prior
to an adult criminal prosecution, a juvenile within a specific age range
(fourteen to seventeen years old) would be presumed immature. This
presumption of immaturity seeks to protect juveniles from an imbalanced administration of justice. The presumption asserts that because
the juvenile is a certain age, he has not fully developed psychosocially
and is thereby less blameworthy than an adult. The State, wanting to
rebut the presumption, must produce evidence showing that the juvenile is mature and as blameworthy as an adult. The following section
discusses presumptions generally, the presumption of immaturity used
in the abortion context, and the application of this presumption in the
context of juvenile justice administration.
1. Presumption of immaturity
A presumption concerns a legally acknowledged relationship between facts.264 It is a rule of law and requires that once specific facts are
established (“basic facts”), the existence of another fact (“presumed
261.
262.
263.
264.

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (quoting plurality opinion).
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990).
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 63 (2d ed. 1995).
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fact”) must be taken as established unless a certain condition is fulfilled.265 In an attempt to decipher the operationalization of presumptions with the introduction of rebuttal evidence, two separate approaches have evolved: Thayer’s “bursting bubble” approach and the
Morgan approach. Under the “bursting bubble” approach a presumption will dissipate when the presumed fact is contradicted by credible
evidence.266 With this, the opponent of the presumption is required to
introduce evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding to the presumption. The opponent only carries the burden of production. The
Morgan theory requires the judge to instruct the jury that it must find
fact B if they find fact A, unless the opponent of the presumption persuades the jury that the absence of fact B is more probably true than
not.267 This approach, in effect, places both the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion on the opponent.
There are two different types of presumptions in the criminal context: mandatory presumptions and permissive presumptions. Mandatory presumptions are either rebuttable or irrebuttable presumptions.
A mandatory rebuttable presumption requires a finding of the presumed fact upon proof of the basic fact unless the opposing party rebuts the presumption. The procedural effect of this type of presumption is to shift the burden of persuasion to the opponent regarding the
presumed fact once the basic fact is established. This burden shifting
is constitutionally permissible so long as the presumed fact is not an
element of a charged offense.268 An irrebuttable mandatory presumption requires that the factfinder find the presumed fact upon proof of
the basic fact although the opposing party rebuts the presumed fact.
Irrebuttable mandatory presumptions are rare in criminal law. Permissive presumptions allow the factfinder to find the presumed fact but
does not require the finding. This is not a burden shifting exercise.
Instead, the permissive presumption provides a connection between
the basic fact and the fact at issue thereby giving the factfinder discretion in presuming a fact.269
265. EDMUND MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 37 (1961).
266. Id. at 34–35.
267. Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV.
59, 82–83 (1933).
268. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
269. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
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The United States Supreme Court has stated that the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments serve as a limit on a
legislature’s ability to create presumptions.270 In order to pass constitutional muster, there must be a “rational connection” between the
facts proven and the fact presumed “and the latter is ‘more likely than
not to flow from’ the former.”271
Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if
there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the
other is arbitrary because of a lack of a connection between the two
in common experience. This is not to say that a valid presumption
may not be created upon a view of relation broader than that a jury
might take in a specific case. But where the inference is so strained as
not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we
know them, it is not competent for the legislature to create it as a rule
governing the procedure of courts.272

The standard for reviewing presumptions sets a relatively low bar.
So long as there is a reasonable relation between the basic fact and the
presumed fact, a presumption ought to pass constitutional scrutiny.
However, mandatory presumptions are typically disfavored as courts
perceive them to weaken the strength of the threshold burden of proof
as well as complicate the assignment of the burden.273
2. Presumption of immaturity in the courts
a. United State Supreme Court and Bellotti. The United States
Supreme Court has dealt with presumptions in a variety of settings and
has in fact reviewed the presumption of immaturity, albeit implicitly.
In Bellotti v. Baird,274 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute
requiring parental consent or parental notification before a minor was
permitted to have an abortion. The Court determined that in order for
such regulations to pass constitutional muster, statutes must
implement procedures permitting minors to bypass parental consent

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 165 (1979).
Tot, 319 U.S. at 467–68.
Id.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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and notification.275 This mechanism is known as a “judicial bypass
provision.”276 Judicial bypass is a procedural mechanism that rests on a
showing of maturity or a Best Interest evaluation. In the case of
“maturity,” judicial bypass allows minors to petition the court to rebut
the presumption of immaturity by showing that they have the
capability to make an informed abortion decision. Judicial bypass also
serves as protection for incompetent minors from immature decisionmaking.277 A finding of sufficient maturity permits the judge to waive
parental involvement. A finding of immaturity may still permit the
judge to waive parental involvement so long as the judge believes it
would be in the minor’s best interest.
In discussing its concern for the vulnerability of minors, the Bellotti
Court asserted that “during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”278
For the plurality, Justice Powell cited First Amendment jurisprudence
for support including Ginsberg v. New York279 and Prince v. Massachusetts,280 both cases where the Court, concerned with the immaturity of
a minor’s decision making, upheld state restrictions on a minor’s freedom. For the Court “immature minors often lack the ability to make
fully informed choices that take account of both the immediate and
long range consequences.”281 Justice Powell also discussed three reasons why the constitutional rights of children are not the equivalent of
those of adults: “. . . the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child rearing.”282 This is manifested
in the a number of different contexts such as voting, service in the military, purchasing alcohol and tobacco, entering contracts, etc.

275. Id. at 643–44.
276. Id. at 651.
277. Satsie Veith, The Judicial Bypass Procedure and Adolescents’ Abortion Rights: The Fallacy
of the Maturity Standard, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 453 (1994).
278. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
279. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court upheld a New York statute
that restricted the sale to children under the age of seventeen of sexually oriented magazines.
280. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Court upheld a Massachusetts
child-labor statute that prohibited children from selling religious literature on a public street.
281. Bellotti, 443 U.S at 640.
282. Id. at 634.
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The United States Supreme Court has not overtly defined “maturity.” The Court has discussed the term and the concept in a number
of different contexts, but has yet to define the term or announce factors
to be considered in making a “maturity” assessment. It came closest to
announcing a principle in Bellotti, when Justice Powell remarked that
“immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices
that account of both immediate and long range consequences. . . .”283
For the plurality, immaturity denotes an inability to evaluate choices
in both the short and long term. Moreover, immature minors are incapable of making informed decisions. Most important, the Court implicitly recognizes that immaturity is an intrinsic characteristic of minors. Lower courts have used this principle to shape factors that could
be considered in making a maturity assessment.
b. Lower Courts. Lower courts have used the dicta in Bellotti to
fashion standards and rules governing maturity determinations. In
H.B. v. Wilkinson,284 District Court Judge Thomas Greene utilized the
principle announced in Bellotti to construct a framework to which
“maturity” may be analyzed by courts. The district court dismissed a
pregnant minor’s lawsuit seeking to prevent a physician from notifying
her parents of the minor’s decision to seek an abortion.285 In essence,
she challenged the Utah Statute requiring notification to an immature
minor’s parents of the minor’s consideration of abortion.286 In order to
assess the minor’s “maturity,” the district court reviewed the
importance of “experience, perspective, and judgment.”287
In evaluating a minor’s “experience,” the district court noted that
“work experience, experience in living away from home, and handling
personal finances” could be important to consider.288 “Perspective” is
assessed with evidence demonstrating a minor’s appreciation for the
283. Id. at 640.
284. 639 F. Supp. 952 (1986).
285. Id.
286. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1953).
To enable the physician to exercise his best medical judgment, he shall:
(3) [N]otify, if possible, the parents upon whom the abortion is to be performed,
if she is a minor. . . This statute was construed by the Utah Supreme Court as
mandating notice where possible to the parents of minors seeking an abortion.
Id.
287. H.B., 639 F. Supp. at 954.
288. Id.
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gravity of her options (in the case of abortion).289 Moreover, the district
court called for an examination of the minor’s ability to consider short
term and long term consequences as well as a realistic perception of
the circumstances.290 “Judgment” questions the minor’s ability to be
“fully informed so as to be able to weigh alternatives independently
and realistically.”291 This characteristic also considers the minor’s conduct including ignorance of assessing options and stress.292
In H.B. the district court’s finding of facts considered both facts
specific to the case as well as facts that may be considered general to
all minors.293 The minor’s marital status, age, whether emancipated,
whether the minor lived at home with her parents, employment status
and history, educational performance and status, and history, familial
history, facts and circumstances surrounding the pregnancy and decision to abort, persons the minor consulted, and results from a variety
of examinations including I.Q.294
State courts have also employed a similar analysis. Florida enacted
a statute that requires a minor to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is “sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy.”295 The court is required to “hear evidence relating to
the emotional development, maturity, intellect, and understanding of
the minor, and all relevant evidence.”296 Florida courts consider a variety of factors in assessing maturity. Such factors include the minor’s
physical age, work experience, proclivity to seek counsel and support
from a trusted adult, awareness of her options other than abortion, employment status and history, educational performance and status, and
life plans.297 The court is thereafter required to issue a written order
with specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that support its

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 955–58.
294. Id.
295. FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c) (2006).
296. Id.
297. In re Doe, 967 So.2d 1017, 1019 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); In re Doe, 924 So.2d 935,
939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); In re Doe, 932 So.2d 278, 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
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decision.298 State courts across the country examine the “maturity” of
a minor in much the same way.299
3. Presumption of immaturity in juvenile transfer decisions.
Juvenile transfer decisions are inconsistent with the common understanding and status of children in the legal domain. Statutory exclusions and automatic transfers presume maturity and permit the state
to circumvent requirements set out in Kent guaranteeing a hearing
prior to transfer as well as the assistance of counsel. Statutory exclusion
and direct file expose juveniles to adult criminal prosecution without
assessing common characteristics that most other courts evaluate prior
to any adjudication involving a minor. Such characteristics include
criminal history, but also psychosocial maturity and social history.300
Indeed, juvenile courts were created because of society’s assumption
that juveniles may be treated constitutionally distinct from adults.301
This recognition lies in the understanding that this different treatment
is permissible because of a juvenile’s lack of maturity.
The presumption of immaturity is a principle in juvenile law that
transcends its substantive progeny. In cases where a juvenile is to be
transferred to adult court for criminal prosecution, there should be
prophylactic protecting of juveniles from entering the adult system
where it is all but guaranteed that the juvenile will recidivate and become an adult criminal offender. The principle undergirding the presumption of immaturity used in juvenile transfer decisions is the same
as was announced in Bellotti v. Baird: minors are incapable of making
reasoned decisions.
The presumption of immaturity may be established by statute, especially in direct file and statutory exclusion jurisdictions. Such a presumption ought to be a rebuttable mandatory presumption. This

298. Id.
299. In re Anonymous, 8 So.3d 1004, 1005–06 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (assessing a minor’s
maturity and considering employment status and minor’s lack of consultation with a trusted
adult); In re Doe, 2008 WL 4681847, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (reviewing lower courts maturity
determination and contemplating minor’s age, work status, and educational performance).
300. Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver Theory and Practice, in CHANGING BORDERS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan
& Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
301. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
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would require the court to presume that a minor is immature and less
blameworthy upon a showing that the juvenile-defendant is under the
age of eighteen. This requires that courts begin the criminal adjudication of a minor with the understanding that juvenile court is the proper
forum because the juvenile is less blameworthy.
The prosecution would have to rebut the presumption by producing evidence tending to show the juvenile’s maturity, and therefore he
or she should be considered as criminally blameworthy as an adult.
Such evidence that may be presented to establish maturity is informed
by the minor abortion line of cases. This evidence would include
whether the juvenile was emancipated, whether the juvenile has ever
been adjudged “mature” in a previous legal proceeding, the juvenile’s
mental health status, I.Q., familial status, social service history, financial dependency, and criminal history. Experts should be called to attest to the psychosocial developmental characteristics of a juvenile generally, as well as the “maturity” level of the individual specifically.
Furthermore, because the State has the burden of proof and persuasion
in a criminal case, the Morgan theory of presumptions is the best fit.
With this, the prosecutor will hold both the burden of production and
persuasion. Moreover, the establishment of maturity ought to be made
by clear and convincing evidence. This threshold inquiry will ensure
that the review of the evidence is more probing, guaranteeing greater
attention to the juvenile-defendants profile and characteristic tendencies. If the prosecutor meets her burden, the judge may determine that
transfer is appropriate. However, if the prosecutor fails to show that
the juvenile is “mature,” the case will be adjudicated in juvenile court.
B. Diminished Capacity as a Defense
While the doctrine of diminished capacity is not the most well settled area of law, it does allow room for interpretation. There is no
standard definition of diminished capacity.302 Many scholars and commentators consider the notion that diminished capacity as a defense is
a “legal colloquialism.”303 Instead, most consider diminished capacity

302. HENRY F. FRADELLA, FROM INSANITY TO DIMINISHED CAPACITY: MENTAL
ILLNESS AND CRIMINAL EXCUSE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 59 (2007).
303. Dressler, supra note 264, at 368 (quoting State v. Humanik, 489 A.2d 691, 697 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)).
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as an evidence doctrine.304 In a criminal trial, a defendant introduces
evidence for the purpose of demonstrating that he or she did not have
the requisite intent required to be convicted of the charged offense. If
the State has not adequately proven to the trier of fact that the defendant possessed the requisite mens rea element, the defendant is entitled
to acquittal or mitigation of the original offense to a lesser included
offense. The problems associated with invoking the doctrine are typically evidentiary as certain evidence is not admissible if the defendant
failed to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. In using the mitigation
model of juvenile justice and guided by Best Interest ideals, an argument can be made that diminished capacity may be used as a defense
in adult criminal prosecutions of juveniles.
Scott and Steinberg’s mitigation framework specifically examining
the diminished capacity of adolescents may be used to demonstrate the
way in which the defense may be utilized as a defense by a juvenile at
trial in adult court. This would allow for mitigation of the original offense based on evidence presented to a jury regarding psychosocial and
biological distinctions between juveniles and adults as well as evidence
related to the “maturity” of the juvenile-defendant. Such testimony
would be used to answer the “question of whether the defendant in fact
possessed a particular mental state of the charged offense.”305 However, it is important to understand the context and complexities of diminished capacity in order to fully comprehend the manner in which
the defense could possibly work.
It is important to note that a debate is forging ahead regarding the
“capacity” of juveniles. Scott and Steinberg argue that adolescents possess a diminished capacity due to immaturity and impulsivity.306 For
them, “youthful choices may share much in common with those of
adults whose decision-making capacities are impaired by emotional
disturbance . . . or failure to understand fully the consequences of their
acts.”307 With this, Scott and Steinberg work within the parameters of
traditional criminal law and established criminal defenses. Professor
Jennifer Drobac challenges this framework by arguing that adolescents

304.
305.
306.
307.

Id.; FRADELLA, supra note 302, at 59–60.
United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 896 (3d Cir. 1987).
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 830.
Id.
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do not in fact possess a diminished capacity.308 Instead, she asserts that
adolescents have a “developing capacity” because they are still developing and maturing into adults.309 Drobac’s formulation of adolescent
capacity captures the lesser criminal blameworthiness of adolescents
that Scott and Steinberg recognize while simultaneously rejecting the
traditional criminal law understanding of lesser capacity as a defense.
While there is a great deal of merit in Drobac’s capacity framework,
for present purposes it is important to stay within the parameters of
the traditional criminal prosecution in adult court and within the confines of already recognized criminal law defenses.
1. Diminished capacity generally
Diminished capacity typically refers to two classes of situations in
which an individual’s atypical mental state will either exonerate her or
result in a conviction of a lesser included offense than was originally
charged.310 For purposes of this article, only the second category will
be discussed. The understanding of diminished capacity in the second
application mitigates or “partially excuses” the offenders guilt even if
she possessed the requisite mens rea to commit the crime.311 With this,
the defense of “partial responsibility” works in a practical sense similar
to an evidentiary rule.312 The goal of the defense is to have such evidence admitted to demonstrate to the trier of fact that although the
offender possessed the intent to commit the crime, she is only partially
responsible because she is a juvenile. Such evidence would most likely
be in the form of experts in the area of neuro-science and psychosocial
studies, mental health experts, counselors, and the like. While such defenses have been used in American courts, only a few states permit the
defense.313
American jurisdictions are divided over what type of evidence concerning mental abnormality should be admissible for the purpose of

308. Jennifer Ann Drobac, Sex and The Workplace: “Consenting” Adolescents and a Conflict of
Laws, 79 WASH. L. REV. 471, 519 (2004).
309. Id.
310. Dressler, supra note 264, at 367.
311. Id. at 368.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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mitigating mens rea outside of the insanity defense. Some jurisdictions
only allow such evidence in murder prosecutions.314 These jurisdictions will allow the introduction of mens rea evidence related to insanity but will not admit it to show that a defendant lacked the capacity to
form the requisite intent to be convicted of the crime charged.315 Others that follow the Model Penal Code permit such evidence so long as
it goes to the complete negation of the mens rea element.316 Finally,
some states permit the defense in the case of specific intent offenses.317
If the defense is permissible, it is generally only used in the context of
homicide—reducing murder to manslaughter.
2. Clark v. Arizona
The United States Supreme Court recently considered a question
on this matter. In Clark v. Arizona,318 the Court considered whether it
was constitutionally permissible to prohibit expert mental health evidence to disprove a mens rea element of the charged offense.319 In its
opinion, the Court differentiated between three types of mens rea evidence: observational, mental disease, and capacity evidence.320 Observational evidence is testimony from witnesses who can describe a defendant’s actions and words.321 It can also include testimony from an
expert on a defendant’s penchant to think or behave a certain way.322
Mental disease evidence concerns a diagnosis of the defendant with
testimony concerning related characteristics of the diagnosed disease.323 Capacity evidence is testimony from an expert regarding the
defendant’s capacity to form the requisite intent necessary to be convicted of the charged offense.324 The law in Arizona permitted the de-

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at 370.
Id. at 371.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02 (2012).
Dressler, supra note 264, at 370.
126 S. Ct. 2709, 2737 (2006).
Id. at 2724–25.
Id. at 2724.
Id.
Id. at 2725.
Id. at 2717–18.
Id. at 2725.
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fendant to introduce observational evidence but prohibited mental disease and capacity evidence from being admitted.325 The Court concluded that Arizona was within its constitutional right to do so.326 The
majority asserted that the state has the right to presume that people
are sane and it was permissible for Arizona to place the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove insanity as a defense.327 The Court
reasoned that allowing the introduction of evidence which would create doubt on mens rea would in effect permit the defendant to rebut the
presumption of sanity.328 With this, the Supreme Court upheld a
State’s right to restrict mental disease and capacity evidence in adult
criminal prosecutions.329
3. Application
While it is clear that most American jurisdictions hesitate in permitting diminished capacity as a defense or severely restrict capacity
evidence, diminished capacity may work in adult prosecutions of juveniles. It may work as a special defense for juveniles, thereby allowing
the introduction of evidence of a juvenile’s “immaturity” and if relevant, a juvenile’s emotional or cognitive disabilities. Such evidence that
may be introduced would relate to the same factors discussed in Section A regarding the presumption of immaturity, including whether
the juvenile has ever been adjudged “mature” in a previous legal proceeding, the juvenile’s mental health status, I.Q., familial status, social
service history, financial dependency, and criminal history. Experts
may be called to testify regarding the general psychosocial developmental characteristics of juveniles as well as the “maturity” level of the
individual specifically.
Prior to the introduction of evidence of diminished capacity, a defendant would have to meet her burden of production by providing
sufficient evidence of “immaturity,” or in the case of children with disabilities, enough evidence of mental disease that would interfere with

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
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Id. at 2730–31.
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the defendant’s ability to develop the requisite mens rea. Once the defendant meets this burden, the defendant’s trial witnesses will testify
that defendant’s capacity to develop the required intent was “diminished” at the time the crime occurred. This would include the introduction of mental health professionals including psychologists, psychiatrists, counselors, social workers, and the like. If the fact-finder finds
the juvenile immature then it may find that the juvenile had diminished
capacity and therefore incapable of forming the requisite intent to
commit the charged offense. However, the jury may only partially excuse the juvenile-defendant and mitigate the charged offense to a lesser
included offense.
Different courts have permitted the admissibility of a variety of evidence to support a defendant’s diminished capacity claim. For example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that evidence concerning volitional impairment (impulse control) is evidence of
diminished capacity.330 Thus, it is likely that the court will allow evidence of the juvenile’s adolescent development and psychosocial status. Such testimony would present the fact-finder with evidence of a
“normal” adolescent response versus the response of the defendant.
Permitting such evidence related to a juvenile’s capacity to form the
requisite mens rea would recognize the very real difference between a
juvenile and an adult. The fact-finder would ultimately decide if the
defendant acted as a juvenile or an adult.
With the criticism and uncertainty surrounding diminished capacity as a defense, it may be difficult to persuade legislators to permit the
use of capacity evidence in adult prosecutions of youth. However, if
Best Interest considerations are the foundation of the juvenile justice,
allowing this defense appears to be an appropriate compromise between those who wish to prosecute juveniles as adults and those who
desire juveniles to be treated differently than adults. Legislators may
also want to consider extending this defense to crimes other than homicide in those prosecutions concerning juveniles.

330. United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 47–48 (3d Cir. 1997).
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C. Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance
The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) approach to partial responsibility in the context of homicide provides guidance on the way in which
neuroscience and psychosocial evidence could be used to mitigate a
juvenile’s criminal responsibility. The mitigating defense of “extreme
mental or emotional disturbance” (“EMED”) permits a defendant to
utilize this defense to mitigate a charge of murder to manslaughter
generally. Some states that have adopted this formulation of homicide,
such as New York, permit the state to charge manslaughter committed
with EMED,331 as well as use EMED as an affirmative defense.332 In
this section, the use of EMED as a defense in adult prosecutions of
juveniles is explored.
1. EMED generally
Under the Model Penal Code, a homicide that is committed as the
product of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there
is a reasonable explanation” constitutes manslaughter as opposed to
murder.333 The EMED defense has two main components: 1) it codifies the common law “sudden heat of passion” principle and 2) it allows
courts to consider partial responsibility as a defense.334 The standard of “reasonableness” for the actor’s conduct is “determined from the viewpoint
of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”335 The American Law Institute explained the operation of partial responsibility as,
[L]ook[ing] into the actor’s mind to see whether he should be judged
by a lesser standard than that applicable to ordinary men. It recognizes the defendant’s own mental disorder or emotional instability as
a basis for partially excusing his conduct . . . To the extent that the
abnormal individual is judged as if he were normal, to the extent that
the drunk man is judged as if he were sober, to the extent, in short,

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
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Dressler, supra note 264, at 375.
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that the defective person is judged as if he were someone else, the
moral judgment of the victim is undermined.336

By specifically recognizing partial responsibility as a defense, the
American Law Institute explicitly recognized individual character defects to be taken into consideration even if just partially. To ignore
such deficiencies is to undermine the normative judgment of the court
and community.
2. Application
In trying juveniles as adults, certainly the courts could consider the
psychosocial and emotional infirmities ever present in adolescent development. While EMED is traditionally used only in the context of
homicide, this is not to say that the reasonableness standard could not
be transported to a variety of cases that involve a juvenile transferred
to adult court. By using both a subjective and objective standard, the
trier of fact would be permitted to consider the frailties inherent in
adolescents, including immaturity and the characteristics associated
with this, when determining the more specific issue of “whether there
is a reasonable explanation or excuse for the defendant’s EMED that
caused him to take a life.” Therefore, if the trier of fact finds that there
was a reasonable explanation for the juvenile-defendant’s emotional
disturbance, based on D’s psychological characteristics that caused him
to commit the crime then the juvenile-defendant is convicted of a
lesser charge.337 By taking into consideration psychosocial factors, factfinders are permitted to adjudicate the offense with the youth’s psychosocial and biological characteristics in mind. Using this formulation to evaluate reasonableness when juveniles are tried in adult court
will allow juries to take into consideration characteristics specific to
juveniles while simultaneously maintaining the “ordinary person”
standard.

336. Id. § 210.3, cmt. at 71–72.
337. Dressler, supra note 264, at 376.
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3. Limitations
Professor Stephen Morse once called for the abolition of the defense. At the time, Morse posited that society did not impose upon
individuals high moral standards.338 All it requires is that we do not
commit serious offenses.339 Even considering mental health infirmities,
Morse would not consider “differences in background, mental or emotional condition, or other factors often thought to necessitate mitigation.”340 Morse’s premise presumes that it is relatively easy not to break
the law. However, it is harder for some than others especially when
considering recent research on policing practices, poverty, and race.341
Thus, Morse’s principle fails to take into account the realities of criminal investigation and criminal prosecution. Professor Morse now
“proposes that the criminal law . . . include a generic, doctrinal mitigating excuse of partial responsibility that would apply to all
crimes . . . .”342
Many have also argued that the partial responsibility is a doubleedged sword. While the defense serves to mitigate the criminal blameworthiness of the defendant by permitting consideration of mental abnormality, it is this defect that exacerbates his dangerousness.343 This
argument may be meritorious in the context of adult dangerous offenders, but it is less salient when applied to juvenile offenders. The
“Best Interest of the Child” standard considers the youth offender
amenable to reform as she is malleable and still developing both biologically and psychosocially.

338. Stephen Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 30 (1984).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 289, 289 (2003).
343. Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two
Children of a Dooned Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 857 (1977).
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VI. Conclusion
The Best Interest ideals of the late nineteenth century carry with
them lessons and principles that are applicable today and may be further utilized in the adult criminal prosecution of juveniles. Understanding that juveniles are capable of change and are inherently different than adults is the first step to creating appropriate safeguards for
juveniles as well as society. This paper is not meant to argue that juveniles should not be punished for their crimes. Instead, the objective of
this article is to recognize differences between juveniles and adults so
as to craft statutory protections in transfer decisions as well as begin to
think about the way in which traditional criminal law defenses may be
utilized during the trial of a juvenile adjudicated in adult court.
The presumption of immaturity, diminished capacity, and EMED
are presently used by hundreds of courts and attorneys in the United
States on a day to day basis. These legal tools are not without limitation
and critique. The presumption of immaturity is thought to be open to
too much subjectivity and discretion. Moreover, the “maturity” characteristic in one juvenile may be different in another. There is no uniform methodology to measure “maturity.” Diminished capacity is not
the most popular defense to be used in a criminal trial and appears to
be losing much of its luster in the way of Clark. EMED, currently only
used in homicide cases, is unlikely to be extended to a defense for juveniles in adult criminal court. Nevertheless, these ideas promote mitigation and recognize the difference between juveniles and adults.
More importantly, these legal tools permit a fact-finder to consider the
inherent distinctions between the two groups at the most critical point
in one’s life: criminal proceedings where the deprivation of liberty is a
real risk.
This article advocates for the resurrection of Best Interest ideals in
today’s juvenile justice system. New theories and ideas are developing
every day in this arena. However, Best Interest remains the strongest
principle in the administration of juvenile justice and juvenile law generally. It is the bedrock principle of the juvenile court system and is
still recognized in the new millennium. Instead of abandoning Best Interest and promoting retribution, legislators need realize the scientific
distinctions and the Supreme Court adoption of the differences between juvenile criminal responsibility and adult blameworthiness. This
469
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should serve as a catalyst to overhaul retributivist juvenile systems in
America. In the meantime, advocates and practitioners ought to consider creative ways to interject Best Interest through mitigation type
vehicles.
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